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Labor Law: Extent of State Power
To Enforce Right-to-Work Laws
Nonunion employees brought suit in a Florida State court
to enjoin the enforcement of an agency shop provision entered
into by their employer. The Florida Supreme Court held that
the executed agreement violated the "right-to-work" provision
in the Florida Constitution and granted the injunction.' On
certiorari the United States Supreme Court held that section
14(b) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA)2 authorizes state courts to enjoin the enforcement of union security provisions pursuant to state law. Retail Clerks Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96 (1963).
Section 7 of the LMRA makes clear that one of the aims of
federal labor legislation is to secure for workers the right to engage in concerted activity.3 Section 8(a)(3) specifically provides
that it is not an unfair labor practice by itself for a union and an
employer to enter agreements requiring union membership of
employees.' Section 14(b) preserves the right of states to regu1. 141 So. 2d 269 (1962).
2. 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1958). Section 14(b) states:
"Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law."
S. Section 7 of the LMRA reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition
of employment as authorized in section 8(a)(3).
61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958).
4. Under § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), 49
Stat. 452 (1985), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1958), the closed shop and
other forms of union security were not prohibited. With the enactment in
1947 of the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 61 Stat.
186 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. H§ 141-87 (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 154-88 (Supp. V, 1964), however, Congress expressly prohibited the closed
shop. The union shop was then approved by implication as the maximum
form of union security under federal law. Section 8(a)(3), the first proviso,
assures that the employer is not precluded, under the onus of an unfair labor
practice, from requiring union membership "after the thirtieth day following
the beginning of such employment." The operation of these statutes establishes the extent of federal law in respect to union security arrangements. See
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late these same union security measures. The States may restrict
union security proposals, even forbid their execution, notwithstanding more permissive federal standards. The instant case
makes it clear that state courts have the power to provide a remedy for violations of state proscription of union security agreements.' The interplay of federal and state policy considerations,
however, provide a broader background for considering the
Schermerhorn decision.
The Court in Schermerhorn held that state power "begins only
with actual negotiation and execution of the type of agreement
described by § 14(b) ."7 In right-to-work states, the policy denouncing union security measures would be more fully implemented if those States were permitted to enjoin activity in
Rains, Construction Trades Hiring Halls, 10 LaB. L.J. 363 (1959); Toner, The
Union-Shop Under Taft-Hartley, 5 LAB. LJ. 552 (1954); Symposium, Union

Security Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 SYRACUSE

. REV. 37 (1959).

5. The type of union security arrangement involved in the instant case
was an "agency shop." Such an arrangement compels workers to pay the
union dues and fees, but does not require them to obtain actual membership.
Of the 20 jurisdictions having right-to-work legislation, 17 specifically outlaw
the agency shop. See 30 FoRDHAm L. REv. 530, 536 (1962). However, only 10
states explicitly prohibit by statute the conditioning of employment by the
payment of dues and fees. For a case in which the legality of the agency shop
is upheld in a state court, see Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631,
159 N.E.2d 408 (1959). On the federal level, the agency shop was held to be
a legal form of union security within section 8(a)(8). See General Motors
Corp., 133 N.L.R.B. 451 (1961), enforcement denied, 303 F.d 428 (1962),

rev'd, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
On the agency shop, see Jones, The Agency Shop, 10 LAB. L.J. 781 (1959);

Pollitt, Right to Work Law Issues: An Evidentiary Approach, 37 N.C.L. REV.
233 (1959); Note, The Agency Shop, Federal Law, and the Right-to-Work
States, 71 YALE LJ. 380 (1961).
6. This case deals with the issue expressly left open for re-argument in
Retail Clerks Int'l v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963). In that case the
Court stated "that the contract involved here is within the scope of § 14(b)
of the National Labor Relations Act and therefore is congressionally made

subject to prohibition by Florida law." Id. at 747. The Court, however, expressly left open the issue of "whether the Florida courts, rather than solely
the National Labor Relations Board, are tribunals with jurisdiction to enforce
the State's prohibition against such arrangements." Id. at 747-48.
Why the Court in the instant case dwelled on the problem of remedies
is not entirely clear. The Court in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959), stated that "judicial concern has necessarily focused
on the nature of the activities which the States have sought to regulate,
rather than on the method of regulation adopted." Since the effect of 14(b)
is clearly to vouchsafe to the States the right to regulate union security proposals, the resultant relief does not seem disputable.
7. 375 U.S. at 105. (Court's emphasis.)
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furtherance of illegal security agreements." If only the application
of an executed agreement is enjoinable, a union would be free to
engage in antecedent concerted activity in pursuance of such an
agreement without judicial interference. There is little reason
for allowing unions to exert economic pressure in furtherance of
illegal ends. The state right-to-work laws are designed to insure
workers absolute freedom to decide whether or not to join a
union." Pre-agreement activity may thwart this policy. Workers
may not be aware that the agreement the union seeks is illegal;
even if they are, individual workers may yield to the pressure
exerted and join to avoid union sanctions.
Schermerhorn, by not supporting the power of state courts to
enjoin activity prior to the execution of an illegal union security
agreement, appears to leave prior union activity solely within the
control of the NIRB. The Court distinguishes union activity
protected or prohibited by federal law from an agreement executed in violation of state law. Absent the agreement any activity resulting in a labor dispute would be subject to the exclusive control of the NLRB under the pre-emption doctrine. 0
The Court cites Local 438 Constr. Union v. Curry" for
the proposition that the pre-emption doctrine would not permit
state court interference with union activities clearly protected or
prohibited by the LMRA." If the Court's reading of Curry is
8. State jurisdiction has always been upheld when the union activity has
been violent or destructive of public property. For such situations, see International Union, UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (malicious conduct);
United Constr. Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954)
(violent picketing); Johnston v. Colonial Provision Co., 128 F. Supp. 954
(D. Mass. 1954) (mass picketing).
9. The Florida constitutional provision drawn into question in Schermerhorn indicates such a policy. "The right of persons to work shall not be denied

or abridged on account of membership or nonmembership in any labor union.
." FLA. CONST. declaration of rights § 12.
10. The Court indicates that absent the agreement, San Diego Bldg. Trades
Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 286 (1959), would be controlling, and any activity
"would be a matter for the National Labor Relations Board. . . ." 375 U.S.
at 105.
In Garmon, the Court develops the pre-emption doctrine, finding that it
should be within the Board's power to hear all those disputes "arguably
subject" to the act. 359 U.S. at 245. Since activity in support of a union
security measure may well be "arguably subject" to the act, the Court adds
the caveat that without the agreement Garmon would be controlling. 375
U.S. at 105.
11. 371 U.S. 542 (1962).
12. 375 U.S. at 105. In Curry the union objecting to a nonunion plant's
wage scale placed a solitary picket at the entrance. The workers honored the
picket and struck. The employer sought and gained an injunction against the
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correct, states may implement their right-to-work laws only when
(1) activity in respect to union security provisions is not subject
to the jurisdiction of the Labor Board, (2) the state law has been
violated, and (3) the union security agreement has reached the
point of execution. The rationale for this position is the desirability of a uniform labor policy under federal law; therefore a minimum of state court interference can be tolerated.
Since section 14(b) explicitly allows the States to outlaw union
security agreements, Congress perhaps has not felt as strongly
about federal uniformity as the Curry decision might indicate. 3
Section 14(b) indicates Congress's concern with state policy in
the union security field.' 4 When the effect on federal policy is
minimal there is no good reason to forbid state courts to implement their right-to-work laws. For example, if the union engages in concerted activity expressly for an illegal security provision, the States should be permitted to afford a remedy before
the agreement is executed." However, if there is a question of
proof involved - if the union justifiably insists that other goals
are sought or is even camouflaging its true intent behind other
genuine allegations - the determination should be made by the
Board. Permitting the States to enjoin activity indiscriminately
would result in vitiating a number of strong federal policies.
The L1V[RA itself contains many sections in which the federal
policy is manifested that unions be free to exert economic pressures and engage in concerted activities. For example, section 13
specifically provides that the right to strike shall not be impaired.
In sections 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) the employer is strictly enjoined
picketing. On appeal, the Supreme Court struck down the injunction finding
that the union's action, although peaceful, was conjecturally a violation of
LMRA § 8(b) and as such (within the sole juridiction of the NLRB.
13. In fact, Mr. Justice Douglas speaking for the Court in Schermerhorn
states: "Congress . . . chose to abandon any search for uniformity in dealing
with the problems of state laws barring the execution and application of
agreements authorized by § 14(b) and decided to suffer a medley of attitudes
and philosophies on the subject." 375 U.S. 104-05.
14. For a discussion of 'the policy behind state right-to-work legislation see,
Torif, The Case for Voluntary Union Membership, 40 IowA L. REV. 621
(1955).

15. The union in this situation is making no claim to immunity from state
law; the Board would have nothing to determine that would express a specific
federal policy.
The Arizona Supreme Court in Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82
Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1959), took a different approach in allowing equitable
relief with respect to a union security measure (an illegal strike). The court
reasoned that since the strike was called for a purpose in contravention of
the State right-to-work law, the strikers were no longer employees and were
no longer protected under the LMRA.
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from interference with union organizational and economic activities. In other sections such as 8(b) (4) (B) and the proviso to
8(b) (4), picketing is protected if conforming to certain conditions.
In addition, there is a strong federal policy against the capricious
exercise of state injunctive power over labor disputes.1 ' That
danger is clear if states were permitted to exercise such power
over pre-agreement activities. The result is that state remedial
power over pre-agreement activities would collide with too many
express federal considerations.
Nonetheless, a situation in which unions are permitted to apply economic pressures for illegal ends should not persist. An
aggrieved employer should be granted recourse to the Board to
prevent these abuses of union prerogatives when such activity
occurs. A Board finding of an unfair labor practice would effectively mediate the competing federal and state policies." Although
the Board must make an initial interpretation of state law on the
question of violation of state right-to-work prohibitions, it is preferable to the situation in which a state may compromise strong
federal policies through the implementation of state remedies.
Schermerhorn is a faithful reading of section 14(b). Perhaps
it will lead to an expansion of Board jurisdiction into pre-agreement activities consonant with the federal and state policies underlying the decision.
Constitutional Law: Should Privilege Against Self
Incrimination Be Available to Sole Shareholder
Regarding Corporate Books and Records?
A special agent of the Internal Revenue summoned the president and sole shareholder of a corporation and demanded the
16. It must be noted that one of the reasons for the expression of federal
anti-injunction policy rests in the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1939),
29 U.S.C. § 101 (1958), which removes such injunctive power from the federal
courts. State courts are not so bound.
17. Of course, a Board determination entails some delay during which
the unions' purposes may be accomplished without injunctive relief. If this
is the case, the Board should implement the § 10(j) injunctive power vested
in it. The Board has never made extensive use of the section, but a situation
in which the unions' motivations are clear should warrant its application.
Section 10(j) reads: "The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint .

.

. charging that any person has engaged in or is engaging in an

unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court .
appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. . . ."

.
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